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Abstract Previous studies of dual agency, where one agent serves both
buyer and seller in a transaction, use hedonic models. Repeat-
sale methods can test for the price effect of accepting dual
agency. Dual agency does not show convincing effects on
expected gain, which would occur if there was a systematic bias,
or on heteroscedasticity, which would occur if there are large
effects that are rare. Earlier researchers could not test for the
effect of an owner picking a listing agent who was the earlier
selling agent. Consistently positive mean abnormal price gains
come from this choice, as well as signiﬁcant heteroscedasticity.
Do inherent principal/agent conﬂicts cause the real estate brokerage industry to
systematically misrepresent buyers and/or sellers? Dual agency in a transaction
involves one agent representing both buyer and seller. Consumer advocates
provide anecdotal evidence that the incidence of representation problems is not
zero. The industry recognized several of the problems long ago. Brokerage
professional associations responded with ethical guidelines that would eliminate
the problem if agents fully and faithfully adhered to the principles. More recently,
states have enacted regulations requiring that clients be fully informed of the
potential for conﬂict of interest.
A review of extensive contributions to the literature on this important topic ﬁnds
that cross-sectional statistical analysis has been the mode of empirical tests as to
whether transaction price is higher versus lower when buyer and seller are
represent by alternative agency formats. This study differs from earlier research
in that it uses a repeat-sale price index model to test for the effect of agency
choice on the percentage gain in price over the tenure of a given owner. Bailey,
Muth and Nourse (1963) and Archer, Gatzlaff and Ling (1996) provide alternative
repeat-sale formats for statistical tests.
For a data unit in this model, the buyer makes a choice on dual agency in the
ﬁrst of a pair of transactions, then another choice at the end of his tenancy in the
house. In addition to the decision to accept dual agency, the owner also chooses
whether to return to the same agent for the second transaction. Using a data set268  Evans and Kolbe
that lists agent names in each transaction, indicator variables can be deﬁned to
record dual agency on the ﬁrst or second of repeat sales of the same house. Also,
a variable may be deﬁned to indicate whether the same agent served the buyer in
the ﬁrst transaction as a selling agent, and then represented that same owner as a
listing agent in the second transaction.
Positive mean abnormal returns may be anticipated for variables deﬁned to
indicate that an owner returned to an agent who sold him the house for repeat
service as a listing agent. The owner may believe that the agent’s superior
representation gave him the opportunity to buy the house at a price lower than
market terms. The owner may believe that these same agency skills will generate
a resale price that is also in the owner’s favor. The positive coefﬁcient may also
come from another source. If an agent becomes familiar with a house while
serving as the selling agent on a transaction, then that familiarity may allow the
agent to more successfully market the house, generating abnormal gains for the
owner.
In applying the repeat-sale regression analysis, two main contexts are asserted as
indication of the existence of principal/agent problems. Of course, if the estimated
repeat-sale regression coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant, then mean holding-
period gains are abnormal for the groups of transactions associated with dual
agency and repeat use of the same agent.
In a second context, the indicator variables may have no signiﬁcant impact on
expected price gain, but still have measurable importance. For example, suppose
such a large number of agents follow ethical guidelines that the distorted
transactions are rare anomalies. While there may be no signiﬁcant regression
coefﬁcients that indicate an effect on expected price gain, the agency variables
may be associated with outliers and the variance of price gains. Thus, a second
set of tests—for heteroscedasticity—may indicate important inﬂuences from the
owners’ agency choices. Findings that agency variables are associated with
heteroscedasticity would also mean that researchers estimating repeat-sale price
indexes need to add even more variables to the list now known to create statistical
problems.
The main results of this paper and its organization are as follows. A review of
the literature for agency effects indicates a lack of consensus among empirical
papers that use cross-sectional hedonic price models. Empirical results also differ
across house price ranges. The next two sections adapt repeat-sale price analysis
to this application and provide sample information and variable deﬁnitions. A
section of statistical results for alternative models deals ﬁrst with tests for
heteroscedasticity, then tests for differences in the expected price gain that a
homeowner may enjoy. The concluding section asserts that the results add new
heteroscedasticity worries for general users of repeat-sale methods. The section
also claims that there is no compelling evidence that dual agency has either the
effects anticipated if there is a general bias in favor of either buyers or sellers or
the effects that might be anticipated if agent misrepresentation has large effects,Homeowners’ Repeat-Sale Gains  269
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but is rare. The ﬁnal main conclusion regards the homeowner’s agency choice of
returning to the agent who sold him the house for employment as a listing agent
upon resale. This agency factor is a major source of heteroscedasticity and is
associated with increased price gains over the period of ownership. These effects
range from almost one-third to more than one-half more than the gain that could
be anticipated from market price trends.
 Review of the Literature
Principal/agent conﬂicts and ambiguities that had existed for years led to a
broker’s mineﬁeld of liability, litigation and professional disciplinary activity that
Bryant and Epley (1992) make vivid. Their review of existing case law made it
clear that a broker has the obligation to negotiate the best possible price for his
client. For example, a seller’s listing agent, having independently found one offer,
is obligated to inform his client of a second broker’s intention to submit a better
offer. Since the seller’s agent would collect a higher income if he did not have to
split commission with the second agent, this obligation presents a principal/agent
conﬂict.
Bryant and Epley (1992) emphasized that the agency relation requires undivided
loyalty to the principal. If one agent represents both buyer and seller, their
opposing interests creates dual agency, which could lead to the agent owing
damages, losing the commission, suffering licensing discipline, and/or allowing
the parties to void the sales contract. If both parties make informed agreement to
the agent’s role, then the agent has better protection than under undisclosed dual
agency.
Bryant and Epley (1992) described how two agents may, even without intention,
create uninformed dual agency if the buyer believes that the selling agent is his
advocate when, in fact, the selling agent is a subagent to the listing agent. The
legal crisis that developed virtually forced the real estate brokerage industry to
reform long-honored relations that had become untenable. Many buyers now have
formal agency contracts with buyer’s brokers, while other buyers get formal
notiﬁcation that their brokers owe all their loyalty to the seller.
The literature has conﬂicting evidence on the beneﬁt of real estate brokerage for
the seller or buyer, whether under old modes of representation or with new
arrangements. An early paper by Jud (1983) made the startling conclusion that
brokers do not affect a given house’s price, even though they do increase the level
of housing consumed by buyers. Using different data and methods, Jud and Frew
(1986) later found evidence that brokers obtain higher prices. They also validated
the earlier indication that broker intermediation increases demand for houses.
After the crisis in brokerage arrangements detailed by Bryant and Epley (1992),
Black and Nourse (1995) compared price and closing cost allocations between
buyers and sellers under two brokerage modes. The ﬁrst involved buyers with
contracts with a buyers’ agent, while the seller has a listing agent or is270  Evans and Kolbe
unrepresented. The second involved either the seller’s listing agent acting as a
dual agent or the selling agent acting as a subagent to the listing agent. Cash
charges at closing were lower when there was a buyers’ agent. This was more
pronounced in higher price ranges. There was no signiﬁcant evidence that the
transactions using a buyer broker had higher prices to reﬂect the reallocation of
closing costs. Of course, this also means that buyers did not win lower prices by
engaging an agent owing all loyalty to the buyers.
Bajtelsmit and Worzala (1997) used bargaining theory to anticipate the impact of
adversarial brokerage and separate buyer representation on ﬁnal price, on buyer’s
net gain relative to reservation price, on seller’s net gain relative to reservation
price and on payments to brokers. Their theoretical comparisons were among
transactions with no agents, with one agent serving both buyer and seller, with
two agents and the buyer informed that the second agent is a subagent for the
seller, with two agents and the buyer not aware of the nature of sub agency, and
with two agents and the buyer having an agency representation that the seller is
aware of.
Bajtelsmit and Worzala (1997) anticipated that lowest price and largest gains to
buyer and seller would come with no broker. They note that this result ignores
all costs other than brokerage fees. Of course, there would be zero payments to
brokers. Their theoretical results indicated that both a dual agency function by
one broker and the case of two agents with disclosed agency yield a higher price
and lower net beneﬁts to buyer and seller. Payments to brokers exist and are a
function of this higher price.
For the case in which two agents do not disclose agency relations to the buyer,
theory indicated the highest price, zero net beneﬁt to the buyer, and seller net
beneﬁts that fall between the no-broker level and the level seen for disclosed
agency. Broker receipts are higher. Finally, buyer brokerage, with agency disclosed
to the seller, yielded a price equivalent to the low, no-broker level. Net beneﬁts
were lower than the no-broker case, but higher than with either dual agency or
sub agency. Broker receipts depend on the details of the buyer broker’s contract.
If brokers are paid a ﬁxed percentage of transaction prices, then brokers will get
paid less under buyer-brokerage than under the agency relations that generate
higher prices.
Benjamin and Chinloy (2000) found a positive relation between buyer brokerage
and sales price, as well as a positive relation between transaction price and the
probability of using a buyers’ broker. They explain the relation by referring to
alternative house marketing strategies. The ﬁrst is a Pricing Strategy: set list price
at or below market price in hopes of a timely sale. The Exposure Strategy involves
setting list price higher than the market price, then depend on increased brokers’
effort and advertising to generate higher ﬁnal price. Benjamin and Chinloy
conclude that brokers concentrate their time on sellers following the pricing
strategy, as opposed to the exposure strategy.Homeowners’ Repeat-Sale Gains  271
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Elder, Zumpano and Baryla (2000) tested for the effect of buyer brokers on selling
price and search duration. Their tests conclude that real estate brokers have no
independent effect on home prices, regardless of the type of broker. The principal
effect is a reduction of buyer search time. Buyer agents reduce this time relative
to for-sale-by-owner cases, but also relative to traditional seller’s agents. Also,
higher income buyers are more likely to employ a buyer’s agent, as are those with
more information and experience. Buyers who receive agency disclosure during a
broker-assisted transaction are more likely to employ a buyer’s agent.
Zietz and Newsome (2001) also addressed the effect of buyer’s agent commission
rates and sale price. Their data are a cross-sectional set of 592 observations from
Orem, Utah, for 1990 through 1997. Variables were sales price, hedonic variables
and the percentage commission paid to the buyer’s agent. The coefﬁcient on the
buyer’s agent commission rate was positive for the whole sample and for a subset
of lower priced houses. The coefﬁcient calculated from higher priced houses is
positive, but not signiﬁcant.
Zietz and Newsome (2002) used a larger and later sample from Orem in a second
study. Buyers not represented by a buyer’s agent paid 2% more for their houses,
but the effect is focused on medium-to-small houses. Small houses, medium-to-
large and large houses showed no statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcients with respect
to buyer’s agency. However, raising the commission percentage paid to the buyer’s
agent raised price for the small-to-medium group. Negative coefﬁcients for the
other groups were not statistically signiﬁcant. Buyers hiring a buyer’s agent from
the same ﬁrm as the listing agent paid lower prices, but the relation is signiﬁcant
only for medium-to-large houses.
 Applying the Repeat-Sale Methodology
The Bailey, Muth and Nourse Specification
Bailey, Muth and Nourse (1963) initiated repeat sale price index analysis by
modeling the ratio of a house’s prices across an individual owner’s period of
buying, b, and selling, s, as being the product of a random component (Uibs) and
a ratio of market price indexes:
p /p  U (M /M ). (1a) is ib ibs s b
Expressing the relation in natural logarithms:
r  ln(p )  ln(p )  u  m  m . (1b) ibs is ib ibs s b272  Evans and Kolbe
The market price indexes could be estimated as a regression problem by using
time period indicator variables, such as Q0i, Q1i, Q2i, ... , QTi, where individual
transactions in the data set occur in T  1 alternative quarters. In the statistical
record for an individual’s ownership of a house, if neither transaction occurred in
period t, then Qti is assigned a zero value. An individual data record would have
two non-zero values across the indicator variables: assign Qbi  1 to indicate
the period that the homeowner ﬁrst bought the house, and Qsi  1 to indicate
the period in which it sold a second time. Setting M0  1, m0  0, normalizes
the index to be deﬁned at 1.00 in the initial period. Equation (1b) is restated as
Equation (1c):
r  u   mQ,o r ibs ibs t t ti
r  u  m (0)  ...  m (1)  ...  m (1)  ...  m (0). ibs ibs 0 bsT
(1c)
This basic Bailey, Muth and Nourse (1963) model can be applied to testing for
the effects of agency representation in alternative ways. First, if the variance of
residuals from empirical estimates of Equation (1c) is associated with agency
variables, then the indication of heteroscedasticity is evidence of the inﬂuence of
agency representation. In such a case, weighted least squares (WLS) estimates of
Equation (1c) may need to include agency variables, in addition to such well
established variance factors as the time between transactions. The existence of
heteroscedasticity also indicates the need for improvement in the speciﬁcation,
beyond the basic repeat sale model.
Bailey, Muth and Nourse (1963, page 935) suggest a second way to apply their
methodology to measure the effects of such factors as ‘‘....remodeling of or
addition to a structure, a change in the number of dwelling units in an apartment
building, a change in the race of the residents of a building or a neighborhood,
and sale for demolition and redevelopment of the property to a new use.’’ Adding
new variables to the model in Equation (1c) yields:
r  u   mQ  bX  bX  ...  bX. (1d) ibs ibs t t ti 11 i 22 ik k i
This variation in the basic repeat sale may be applied to the current research topic
by using (1,0) variables to indicate agency representation alternatives. Rejecting
the null hypothesis that all of agency-related coefﬁcients are zero means that some
agency representation effect on expected price gain across homeowners’ tenures
can be identiﬁed. If the null hypothesis that a particular coefﬁcient is zero is
rejected, a positive regression coefﬁcient indicates a higher average percentageHomeowners’ Repeat-Sale Gains  273
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price gain observed for that sub-group of houses. If dual agency favors sellers
over buyers, then a negative coefﬁcient on a variable deﬁned to indicate that an
owner bought his house while being served by the seller’s own agent would be
expected. By the same logic, a variable deﬁned to indicate dual agency on the
second of a pair of transactions may have a positive sign. If dual agency gives
biased representation in favor of the buyer, then the pattern of signs would be
reversed
Applying the Archer, Gatzlaff and Ling Specification
The Bailey, Muth and Nourse (1963) speciﬁcation cannot test for price patterns
that vary over time within the sub-group relative to the rest of the sample. To
measure sub-group deviations in price that can change over time, Archer, Gatzlaff
and Ling (1996) adapted the repeat sale methodology. Their variation of Equation
(1a) can be written:
p /p  U (M /M )(G /G ), (2a) ijs ijb ijbs s b js jb
where variables Gjs and Gjb are group index values to describe how the group of
houses in sub-market j differs from the overall market. The random term Uijbs is
the ratio of random variation in an individual house’s price appreciation in its ﬁrst
sale and its second, Rijs/Rijb. Expressing the relation in natural logarithms:
r  ln(p )  ln(p )  u  m  m  g  g . (2b) ijbs ijs ijb ijbs s b js bj
Setting M0  1, m0  0, Gj0  1 and gj0  0 normalizes indexes for the overall
market and sub-market to be 1.00 in the initial period.
Archer, Gatzlaff and Ling (1996) tested for differences between overall market
price trends and prices in speciﬁed sub-markets, seventy-nine alternative
neighborhoods in Dade County, Florida. They tested for sub-market differences,
one group at a time. For a house in group j, their variation of the repeat-sale
regression can be written as:
r  u   mQ  gIQ, (2c) ijbs ijbs t t tij t tj ij tij
where Iij is a (1,0) indicator variable to indicate whether an individual house is or
is not in the group. If a house is not in the group, the Equation (2c) algebraically
reverts to Equation (1c). If the house is in the group, then Equation (2c) becomes:274  Evans and Kolbe
r  u  m (1)  m (1)  g (1)(1)  g (1)(1). ijbs ijbs b s jb js (2d)
Rejecting the null hypothesis that all gjt are zero means that it is reasonable to
discuss differences in price trends between the overall market and one sub-market.
The null hypothesis means that the price index for the whole market is the same
as for the sub-market in every quarter. If the null hypothesis that an individual
sub-market coefﬁcient is zero is rejected, then there is an indication that there is
a one-period deviation between overall market appreciation and the sub-market.
Archer, Gatzlaff and Ling (1996:342) point out that the existence of a signiﬁcant
one-period abnormal return may be irrelevant. Given transaction costs,
homeowners do not buy and sell quarter by quarter. Their holding-period gain or
loss relative to the overall market is based on the cumulative abnormal
appreciation in their sub-market, not on any one individual quarter. With T  1
quarters in the analysis, there are T  1  h conceivable h-quarter holding-periods.
Archer, Gatzlaff and Ling argue that the appropriate test for important sub-market
deviations is a test of the null hypothesis that the average holding-period abnormal
gain is zero.
The sub-market h-quarter holding-period deviation from the overall market price
trend can be written as gjt  gj(th). If the sum of all T  1  h of these differences
is zero, then the average holding-period return in the sub-market is no different
from the overall market. Assuming h  4 and T  21, this sum can be written
as (gj21  gj17)  (gj20  gj16)  (gj19  gj15)  (gj18  gj14)  (gj17  gj13)  ...
 (gj8  gj4)  (gj7  gj3)  (gj6  gj2)  (gj5  gj1)  (gj4  gj0)  gj21  gj20
 gj19  gj18  gj3  gj2  gj1  0, since normalization set gj0 at zero.
Thus, an F-test of the null hypothesis that the sub-market h-quarter holding-period
gains average zero can be formulated as a test on a restriction expressed as a
linear combination of the estimated coefﬁcients:
0  g  g  ...  g  g  ...  g . (2e) jT j(T1) j(Th1) j(h1) j1
If dual agency systematically favors sellers, then holding-period abnormal gains
may have negative means for the sub-market deﬁned by dual agency on the ﬁrst
of a pair of transactions. Under that assumption, abnormal gains may have positive
averages for the sub-market deﬁned by dual agency on the second of a pair of
transactions. If dual agency favors buyers instead of sellers, then means for
abnormal gains would have the opposite pattern of signs.
In one aspect, this study deviates in application from Archer, Gatzlaff and Ling
(1996). Most likely because of the large number of groups, Archer, Gatzlaff andHomeowners’ Repeat-Sale Gains  275
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Exhibit 1  Sample Proportions
Sample Count DUAL 2  0 DUAL 2  1
DUAL 1  0 2910 557 3467
DUAL 1  1 559 128 687
3469 685 4154
Proportions DUAL 2  0 DUAL 2  1
DUAL 1  0 70.1% 13.4% 83.5%
DUAL 1  1 13.5% 3.1% 16.5%
83.5% 16.5% 100.0%
Contingencies DUAL 2  0 DUAL 2  1
Given DUAL 1  0 83.9% 16.1% 100%
Given DUAL 1  1 81.4% 18.6% 100%
Sample Count RETURN  0 RETURN  1
DUAL 1  0 2620 847 3467
DUAL 1  1 566 121 687
3186 968 4154
Proportions RETURN  0 RETURN  1
DUAL 1  0 63.1% 20.4% 83.5%
DUAL 1  1 13.6% 2.9% 16.5%
76.7% 23.3% 100.0%
Contingencies RETURN  0 RETURN  1
Given DUAL 1  0 75.6% 24.4% 100%
Given DUAL 1  1 82.4% 17.6% 100%
Notes: DUAL 1 is deﬁned to be zero, except when one agent represented both parties in the ﬁrst
of a pair of transactions for a given house—then DUAL 1  1. DUAL 2 is deﬁned to be zero,
except when one agent represented both parties in the second of a pair of transactions for a
given house—then DUAL 2  1. RETURN is deﬁned to equal zero, except if the same agent
represented the buyer in his ﬁrst transaction, and then the seller in the second transaction—then
RETURN  1.
Ling estimated Equation (2c) in two steps for each group. In the ﬁrst step—
common to all groups, only the overall market index coefﬁcients were estimated
in a regression that does not differ from the basic Bailey, Muth and Nourse (1963)
model. The residuals from the ﬁrst step become ‘‘abnormal returns’’ associated
with sub-market membership. They are the dependent variable for a second
regression to estimate the sub-market price index coefﬁcients.
As shown in Exhibit 1, sub-markets in this study account for 16.5% to 23.3% of
the total sample. If one group is large enough as a proportion of the sample, then
the two step procedure will allow the observations within that group to heavily
inﬂuence the ﬁrst step. Those observations’ residuals would be smaller in absolute276  Evans and Kolbe
value, distorting the test for sub-market differences. This point would not justify
disputing the empirical results of Archer, Gatzlaff and Ling (1996). Seventy-nine
sub-markets are enough so that no one is likely to unduly inﬂuence their ﬁrst
step’s estimation. Of course, there was no practical alternative for their study.
However, the reader should note that the results reported here come from joint
estimation of the coefﬁcients in Equation (2c) instead of the two-step method used
by Archer, Gatzlaff and Ling.
 Sample and Data Definitions
Transaction data come from houses in Memphis, Tennessee that had at least one
agent with membership in the Multiple Listing Service. The MLS recorded 65,525
sales between the fourth quarter of 1997 and the mid-point of the ﬁrst quarter of
2003. The data set included data on transaction price, day of sale, street address,
ZIP code, the name of the agent representing the seller—the listing agent, and
the name of the agent representing the buyer, the selling agent. If data were
incomplete for a transaction, or if the ZIP code was not in the Memphis area,
then the data point was dropped from the sample.
A sort of the ﬁle by day of sale allowed the calculation of a variable, the percentile
rank of the house among the closest 200 houses in the sorted ﬁle. (This is the
100 houses just before and the 100 houses just after the house in the list of all
houses sorted by date of sale.) Resorting the ﬁle by street address allowed the
identiﬁcation of 10,891 transactions involving individual houses that sold more
than once during the time span of the data set. Repeat-sale price indexes are
calculated only from samples of houses that sell more than once. The odd number,
10,891, is not divisible by two because some houses sold three or more times. If
one house sold three times, then it would provide two separate data points for a
repeat-sale price index analysis.
The organization of the sample data set is by individual owners’ price and sales
history. The variable p1, the ﬁrst price, is what a given owner paid, while the
variable p2, the second price, is what the same owner sold the house for on resale.
Variables d1 and d2 are numerical values representing the dates of the two sales.
The variable DAYSIN  d2  d1, is the length of ownership in days. The
transactions were not considered reliable indicators of market trends if DAYSIN
was less than 31. These data points were edited from the statistical sample.
A series of quarterly indicator variables were deﬁned, Q 1997 4, Q 1998 1, ...
and Q 2003 1.I fd1 fell into a given quarter, then the value of that quarterly
indicator was assigned a value of 1. If d2 fell into a given quarter, then the
value of that quarterly indicator was assigned a value of 1. All the other quarterly
indicator variables for that individual were assigned values of 0. If d1 and d2 fell
into the same quarter, then the data point was edited from the sample as incapable
of providing information about price trends across quarters.Homeowners’ Repeat-Sale Gains  277
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The statistical results reported here are limited to houses that are in the upper
three quarters of the price ranges for their period of ﬁrst sale. Many houses in the
lowest quartile are purchased, in fact, for land only. Memphis also has an active
market involving the purchase of abandoned houses for the purpose of heavy
investment in rehabilitation, then resale as low income housing. The price trend
in the market would not be represented by price patterns for these transactions.
The data set had no variable to indicate individual houses in these categories.
Thus, the house was dropped from the statistical sample if the ﬁrst price was
below the twenty-ﬁfth percentile of houses that sold at about that same time. The
house was also deleted from study if there was more than a twenty point change
in the percentile ranking between the ﬁrst and second transactions. A positive
change larger than this limit makes it more likely that heavy rehabilitation had
markedly changed the house’s market position. A negative change of more than
twenty points is likely to reﬂect severe depreciation over a relatively short period.
The success of repeat-sale price index is predicated on the individual house being
roughly the same at the two dates of sale.
Agency variables are deﬁned as follows. If one agent represented both buyer and
seller in the ﬁrst transaction for a given pair of sales, then the variable DUAL 1
is assigned a value of 1. If there was not dual agency in this transaction, then
DUAL 1  0. Likewise, DUAL 2  (1,0) to indicate dual agency in the second
of the two transactions. The agents’ names in the MLS records indicate whether
the selling agent in the ﬁrst transaction was the same person as the listing agent
in the second transaction. The variable RETURN  (1,0) is used to indicate
whether the owner returned to the same agent who helped the owner buy the
house when it came time to resell the house.
Exhibit 1 reports the sample sizes, proportions and conditional proportions across
these agency variables. The proportion of the ﬁrst transactions that saw separate
representation for the parties, 83.5%, is virtually the same proportion as seen
among second transactions. However, only 70.1% of the paired sales had no
incidence of dual agency. Dual agency for both transactions occurred in 3.1% of
the sample. Given that a buyer accepted dual agency on the ﬁrst transaction, there
was an 18.6% probability of dual agency on the second.
The owner returned to list with the same agent that he knew from the ﬁrst
transaction in 23.3% of the sample. Interestingly, this indication of satisfaction
varies by the nature of the representation in the ﬁrst transaction. If the agent
represented the buyer only in the ﬁrst transaction, then there was a 24.4%
probability that the owner would return to the same agent. If that agent had been
serving both buyer and seller on the ﬁrst transaction, then there was only a 17.6%
probability of return.
Exhibit 1 makes it clear that an alternative set of agency variables is possible.
DUAL 1and2, DUAL 1not2 and DUAL 2not1 were deﬁned to cover the four
permutations of the incidence of dual agency in repeat-sale data. None of the278  Evans and Kolbe
statistical results change in a qualitative way depending on the set of variables
applied.
Unfortunately, the data set cannot make an important dual agency distinction.
When a buyer is associated with his own agent, that agent may fall into two
categories. The selling agent may be acting as a sub-agent to the listing agent, in
which case the selling agent represents the seller. Alternatively, the buyer may
have signed a contract with his agent to represent him as a buyer’s agent, which
would better align the agent’s incentives with the buyer. The data set does not
allow the deﬁnition of a variable to indicate this important distinction.
With data editing and exclusions, the resulting sample size is 4,154 repeat sales.
Many researchers, for example Zietz and Newsome (2001, 2002), found different
principal/agent problems in different house price categories. The sample used here
may be divided into a mid-range category of 1,537 houses and a high-end range
with 2,617. The houses in the mid-range sub-sample ranked between the twenty-
ﬁfth and the sixtieth percentile in their ﬁrst transaction—and then did not change
up or down more than twenty percentile points, while the high-end houses initially
ranked above the sixtieth percentile.
 Empirical Results
Using the Bailey, Muth and Nourse Specification
Exhibit 2 presents the results of tests for heteroscedasticity, using squared residuals
from model (1c), Bailey, Muth and Nourse’s (1963) basic repeat-sale price index
model. The set-wise test for zero coefﬁcients on all these variables gives an F-
Statistic of 2.68, which deﬁnes a range of larger F-Statistics that has only 0.02
probability of occurring by sampling error if the null hypothesis is true. The null
hypothesis is that none of the variables are associated with heteroscedasticity.
Thus, there is reason to believe that there is heteroscedasticity with respect to the
residuals from the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of the repeat-sale price
index model.
Individually and as a set of two, the variables DAYSIN and DAYSIN2 do not appear
highly associated with heteroscedasticity in the full sample of 4,154 houses.
Likewise, neither dual agency variable is statistically signiﬁcant as a determinant
of heteroscedasticity. However, RETURN has a non-zero estimated coefﬁcient that
is large relative to its standard error. The 3.12 t-ratio is signiﬁcant at beyond the
0.01 level in this test for heteroscedasticity.
Exhibit 2 also shows the results of a test for heteroscedasticity in an OLS
estimation of Equation (1d). This is Bailey, Muth and Nourse’s (1963)
speciﬁcation with added explanatory variables to test for the effect of agency
choice. The heteroscedasticity found for the full sample has the same qualitative
nature as described for the residuals from Equation (1c).Homeowners’ Repeat-Sale Gains  279
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Exhibit 2  Tests for Heteroscedasticity: Estimated Coefﬁcients Using OLS Squared Residuals
as Dependent Variables
DUAL 1 DUAL 2 RETURN DAYSIN DAYSIN2 F
Equation (1c)
Full Sample .0013 .0008 .0063* .0000 .0000 2.68**
Mid-Range Sub-sample .0013 .0029*** .0013 .00002* .00001* 3.64*
High-End Sub-sample .0013 .0004 .0114* .0000 .0000 2.87*
Equation (1d)
Full Sample .0011 .0009 .0053* .0000 .0000 2.19**
Mid-Range Sub-sample .0008 .0027*** .0024*** .00002* .00001* 3.55*
High-End Sub-sample .0012 .0002 .0105* .0000 .0000 2.66**
Equation (2d), DUAL 1 Included
Full Sample .0016 .0008 .0064* .0000 .0000 2.78**
Mid-Range Sub-sample .0015 .0025 .0006 .00002* .00001* 3.09*
High-End Sub-sample .0019 .0006 .0116* .0000 .0000 3.04*
Equation (2c), DUAL 2 Included
Full Sample .0013 .0004 .0064* .0000 .0000 2.74**
Mid-Range Sub-sample .0010 .0022 .0005 .00002* .00001* 3.34*
High-End Sub-sample .0015 .0011 .0114* .0000 .0000 2.94**
Equation (2c), RETURN Included
Full Sample .0011 .0009 .0055* .0000 .0000 2.45**
Mid-Range Sub-sample .0010 .0027 .0021 .00002* .00001* 3.56*
High-End Sub-sample .0009 .0003 .0102* .0000 .0000 2.73**
Notes: The F-Statistic tests the null hypothesis that none of the variables are associated with
heteroscedasticity. DUAL 1  (1,0) indicates that one agent served both parties in the ﬁrst of a
pair of sales. DUAL 2  (1,0) indicates that one agent served both parties in the second of a
pair of sales. RETURN  (1,0) indicates that the same agent represented buyer in the ﬁrst
transaction and seller in the second. DAYSIN  the number of days between the pair of
transactions.
*Test statistic is signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
**Test statistic signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
***Test statistic is signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level.
Heteroscedasticity patterns are different when the sample is segmented. Results
for the mid-range sub-sample are reported in Exhibit 2. The dependent variable
is the squared residual from an OLS estimate of Equation (1c) estimated from
this sub-sample. For only this sub-sample, the variables DAYSIN and DAYSIN2 are
statistically signiﬁcant, as could be expected based on other researchers’
application of the repeat-sale price index model. For this sub-sample only, dual
agency on the second of the pair of transactions (but not on the ﬁrst) would be
signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level in a test for heteroscedasticity. Again unique to this
sub-sample, the RETURN variable was not statistically signiﬁcant. The tests for
heteroscedasticity in the high-end sub-market follow the pattern described for280  Evans and Kolbe
Exhibit 3  WLS Estimates for Equation (1d)—A Test for Agency Variables’ Impact in the






DUAL 1 0.0049 0.0110 0.0014
(0.97) (1.57) (0.17)
DUAL 2 0.0025 0.0034 0.0088
(0.57) (0.56) (1.27)
RETURN 0.0422 0.0494 0.0392
(13.0)* (7.05)* (9.12)*
Q 1997 4 00 0
(na) (na) (na)
Q 1998 1 0.0089 0.0204 0.0008
(1.22) (1.93)** (0.08)
Omitted Section of Exhibit
Q 2003 1 0.1271 0.1290 0.1280
(12.9)* (8.97)* (8.76)*
H0: Variables DUAL 1, DUAL 2 and RETURN are redundant as a set
F-Statistic 57.0* 18.4* 27.8*
H0: Variables DUAL 1 and DUAL 2 are redundant as a set
F-Statistic 0.60 1.51 0.83
Note: t-ratios are beneath coefﬁcients. The dependent variable is LN(P2/P1). For the full sample,
n  4,154; for the mid-range sub-sample, n  1,537; and for the high-end sample, n  2,617.
DUAL 1  (1,0) indicates that one agent served both parties in the ﬁrst of a pair of sales. DUAL
2  (1,0) indicates that one agent served both parties in the second of a pair of sales. RETURN
 (1,0) indicates that the same agent represented buyer in the ﬁrst transaction and seller in the
second. DAYSIN  the number of days between the pair of transactions.
*Test statistic is signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
**Test statistic signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
***Test statistic is signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level.
the combined sample, with only RETURN being an apparent source of
heteroscedasticity.
While some of these variables in the speciﬁcation for a test for heteroscedasticity
appear redundant, all are included to generate weights for WLS estimations.
Some are well established in the literature on heteroscedasticity in repeat-sale
regressions. Some have statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcients when the sample is
segmented by price range.
Exhibit 3 has the WLS estimates associated with Equation (1d). A test of the null
hypothesis that the three agency indicator variables are redundant indicates thatHomeowners’ Repeat-Sale Gains  281
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they are signiﬁcant, having a 57.0 F-Statistic in a set-wise test. The coefﬁcient on
DUAL 1 is positive, while the coefﬁcient on DUAL 2 is negative. This would
be consistent with dual agency being biased in favor of buyers. However, neither
individual coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant. A test of the null hypothesis that
both coefﬁcients are zero yields an insigniﬁcant F-Statistic.
The positive coefﬁcient on RETURN indicates that homeowners who returned to
the agent who represented them in the ﬁrst transaction had higher average price
gains over their tenure. This coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant. Exhibit 3 also
shows relevant coefﬁcients from WLS estimates of Equation (1d), using alternative
sub-samples. In both sub-samples, RETURN has positive, statistically signiﬁcant
coefﬁcients.
If dual agency systematically favors buyers over sellers, or vice versa, then the
coefﬁcients on DUAL 1 and DUAL 2 would have opposite signs. The signs on
DUAL 1 and DUAL 2 are not opposite in signs in either sub-sample. In addition,
none of the coefﬁcients on dual agency variables are statistically signiﬁcant. Thus,
tests from the Bailey, Muth and Nourse (1963) model ﬁnd that dual agency did
not impact expected price gain in any statistically signiﬁcant way that would favor
either buyers or sellers. On the other hand, expected gain increased for those
homeowners who listed for their resale with the same agent that sold the house
to them.
Results Using the Archer, Gatzlaff and Ling
Specification
Ordinary least squares estimates of Equation (2c) generates residuals with
signiﬁcant heteroscedasticity regardless of the agency variable used in the
speciﬁcation suggested by Archer, Gatzlaff and Ling (1996). These statistical
results are reported in Exhibit 2. All the F-Statistics indicate signiﬁcant
heteroscedasticity for each test reported in the exhibit. For the full sample, the
heteroscedasticity has the same general qualitative form as discussed above for
the Bailey, Muth and Nourse model (1963). That is, DAYSIN and DAYSIN2 are
not statistically signiﬁcant as individual variables or as a set of two variables in
the test for heteroscedasticity. Similar heteroscedasticity results are found for
DUAL 1 and DUAL 2. Only the variable RETURN is statistically signiﬁcant in
the tests for heteroscedasticity in the full sample.
Segmenting the housing market into high-end and mid-range sub-markets
generates some differences in tests for heteroscedasticity and expected value of
price increases. For the mid-range sub-sample of 1,537 repeat sales, the residuals
of OLS estimates of Equation (2c) show heteroscedasticity with respect to DAYSIN
and DAYSIN2, for each estimation using DUAL 1, DUAL 2 and RETURN in cross
product variables. No heteroscedasticity with respect to DUAL 1, DUAL 2 or
RETURN is indicated for the mid-range sub-sample. The estimated coefﬁcients
for these tests are in Exhibit 2.282  Evans and Kolbe
For the high-end sub-sample of 2,617 houses, the residuals of OLS estimates of
Equation (2c) show no heteroscedasticity with respect to DAYSIN and DAYSIN2,
for each estimation using DUAL 1, DUAL 2 and RETURN in cross product
variables. DUAL 1 and DUAL 2 are also not statistically signiﬁcant sources of
heteroscedasticity. However, RETURN is signiﬁcant as a source of
heteroscedasticity in all three OLS estimations, reported below, they are estimated
from models of heteroscedasticity that include all ﬁve potentially important
sources of heteroscedasticity, DAYSIN, DAYSIN2, DUAL 1, DUAL 2 and
RETURN.
Weighted least squares tests for the effect of DUAL 1, the variable indicating that
the same agent represented both buyer and seller in the ﬁrst of a pair of sales, are
based on the coefﬁcients presented in Exhibit 4. Coefﬁcients on variables Q
1998 1, ... , Q 2003 1 were estimated in the application of Equation (2c), but
most are omitted from the exhibit to save space. (Coefﬁcients on Q 1997 and
Q 1997 4*DUAL 1 are set at 0 to normalize the indexes to equal 1.00 in that
initial period.) All the tests here are based on the coefﬁcients associated with the
cross-product variables. The twenty-two cross-product variables have the general
form of ‘‘DUAL 1*Quarter.’’
All but one of the coefﬁcients are positive. Nine of the coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant
in individual t-tests at the 0.10 level. However, they yield a low F-Statistic in a
test that they are redundant as a set of variables. Thus, the null hypothesis that
every coefﬁcient is zero cannot be rejected. Exhibit 4 also includes calculation of
all eighteen possible abnormal four-quarter period returns for the sub-market
deﬁned by this incidence of dual agency. The average four-quarter holding-period
abnormal return, 0.00046, is positive. The signiﬁcance of this mean abnormal
return can be tested by testing for the linear restriction on the cross-product
coefﬁcients described in Equation (2d). The F-Statistic calculated for this
restriction is very small. Thus, the null hypothesis that there are no abnormal
returns in this sub-market over four-quarter holding-periods cannot be rejected.
Similar conclusions come from a test over eight-quarter holding-periods, except
that the mean effect is slightly negative.
Exhibit 5 has coefﬁcients estimated to test for effects if one agent represented
both buyer and seller in the second transaction observed for each house. In this
case, no individual coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant in a test at the 0.10 level. However,
the set of all cross-product variables generate an F-Statistic that is signiﬁcant in
a test at the 0.10 level.
In tests for abnormal holding-period returns associated with DUAL 2, means are
negative and larger in absolute value than seen for DUAL 1. The negative mean
for eight-quarter holding-periods is signiﬁcant in a test at the 0.01 level, but a test
would have to be conducted at the 0.12 level to reject the null hypothesis that
there is no four-quarter abnormal return.
The strongest conclusions come from the tests on the RETURN variable, shown
in Exhibit 6. All but two coefﬁcients on the cross-product variables are positive.Homeowners’ Repeat-Sale Gains  283
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Exhibit 4  Dual Agency on the First of Paired Sales, WLS Estimates for Equation (2c) and Abnormal






Q 1997 4 0
Q 1998 1 0.0003
(0.04)
Omitted Section of Exhibit
Q 2003 1 0.1473
(13.8)*
DUAL 1*Q 1997 4 0
(na)
DUAL 1*Q 1998 1 0.0377
(1.59)
DUAL 1*Q 1998 2 0.0171
(0.79)
DUAL 1*Q 1998 3 0.0213
(1.01)
DUAL 1*Q 1998 4 0.0426 0.0426
(1.85)***
DUAL 1*Q 1999 1 0.0548 0.0171
(2.37)**
DUAL 1*Q 1999 2 0.0458 0.0286
(2.07)**
DUAL 1*Q 1999 3 0.0296 0.0083 0.0296
(1.19)
DUAL 1*Q 1999 4 0.0444 0.0018 0.0067
(1.49)
DUAL 1*Q 2000 1 0.0546 0.0002 0.0375
(1.65)***
DUAL 1*Q 2000 2 0.0014 0.0472 0.0227
(0.05)
DUAL 1*Q 2000 3 0.0327 0.0031 0.0099
(1.35)
DUAL 1*Q 2000 4 0.0501 0.0058 0.0047
(2.16)**
DUAL 1*Q 2001 1 0.0503 0.0044 0.0045
(1.92)***
DUAL 1*Q 2001 2 0.0425 0.0439 0.0129
(2.00)**284  Evans and Kolbe
Exhibit 4  (continued)
Dual Agency on the First of Paired Sales, WLS Estimates for Equation (2c) and Abnormal






DUAL 1*Q 2001 3 0.0250 0.0077 0.0194
(1.12)
DUAL 1*Q 2001 4 0.0470 0.0031 0.0076
(1.84)***
DUAL 1*Q 2002 1 0.0140 0.0362 0.0154
(0.65)
DUAL 1*Q 2002 2 0.0227 0.0198 0.0100
(1.04)
DUAL 1*Q 2002 3 0.0185 0.0065 0.0316
(0.88)
DUAL 1*Q 2002 4 0.0350 0.0120 0.0152
(1.70)***
DUAL 1*Q 2003 1 0.0082 0.0059 0.0343
(0.26)
Average Holding Period Change 0.0005 0.0032
Notes: t-ratios are beneath coefﬁcients. DUAL 1  (1,0) to indicate that one agent served both
parties in the ﬁrst of a pair of sales. H0: Variables ‘‘DUAL 1*Quarter’’ are redundant as a set;
F  0.83. H0: Mean abnormal four-quarter holding-period Change is 0; F  0.03. H0: Mean
abnormal eight-quarter holding-period change is 0; F  0.34.
*Test statistic is signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
**Test statistic signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
***Test statistic is signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level.
Ten individual coefﬁcients would be signiﬁcant in tests at the 0.10 level. The set
of variables would be considered signiﬁcant in a test at the 0.01 level. The average
abnormal returns for both four and eight-quarter holding-periods are positive; both
are statistically signiﬁcant in a test at the 0.01 level.
Summary statistics from WLS estimates for alternative price range sub-samples
are in Exhibit 7. For the mid-range houses, the null hypothesis that the set of
coefﬁcients are zero for all the cross product terms including DUAL 1 is rejected.
While abnormal returns average positive values for both four-quarter and eight-
quarter holding-periods, these are not statistically signiﬁcant. For the high-end
houses, no null hypothesis can be rejected.
For DUAL 2, the set of cross product variables are signiﬁcant for the mid-range
sub-sample, but not the high-end sub-sample. Tests for signiﬁcant abnormalHomeowners’ Repeat-Sale Gains  285
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Exhibit 5  Dual Agency on the Second of Paired Sales, WLS Estimates for Equation (2c) and Abnormal






Q 1997 4 0
(na)
Q 1998 1 0.0074
(0.89)
Omitted Section of Exhibit
Q 2003 1 0.1559
(14.5)*
DUAL 2*Q 1997 4 0
(na)
DUAL 2*Q 1998 1 0.0079
(0.40)
DUAL 2*Q 1998 2 0.0010
(0.05)
DUAL 2*Q 1998 3 0.0040
(0.21)
DUAL 2*Q 1998 4 0.0094 0.0094
(0.45)
DUAL 2*Q 1999 1 0.0092 0.0172
(0.41)
DUAL 2*Q 1999 2 0.0176 0.0166
(0.84)
DUAL 2*Q 1999 3 0.0186 0.0226
(0.89)
DUAL 2*Q 1999 4 0.0279 0.0185 0.0279
(1.01)
DUAL 2*Q 2000 1 0.0041 0.0051 0.0120
(0.15)
DUAL 2*Q 2000 2 0.0216 0.0393 0.0226
(1.09)
DUAL 2*Q 2000 3 0.0100 0.0085 0.0140
(0.47)
DUAL 2*Q 2000 4 0.0122 0.0401 0.0216
(0.56)
DUAL 2*Q 2001 1 0.0169 0.0128 0.0077
(0.75)
DUAL 2*Q 2001 2 0.0181 0.0036 0.0357
(0.93)286  Evans and Kolbe
Exhibit 5  (continued)
Dual Agency on the Second of Paired Sales, WLS Estimates for Equation (2c) and Abnormal






DUAL 2*Q 2001 3 0.0088 0.0013 0.0098
(0.42)
DUAL 2*Q 2001 4 0.0323 0.0445 0.0044
(1.41)
DUAL 2*Q 2002 1 0.0096 0.0266 0.0137
(0.47)
DUAL 2*Q 2002 2 0.0332 0.0151 0.0116
(1.56)
DUAL 2*Q 2002 3 0.0296 0.0208 0.0195
(1.52)
DUAL 2*Q 2002 4 0.0257 0.0066 0.0379
(1.27)
DUAL 2*Q 2003 1 0.0450 0.0354 0.0619
(1.60)
Average Holding Period Change 0.0035 0.0108
Notes: t-ratios are beneath coefﬁcients. DUAL 2  (1,0) indicates that one agent served both
parties in the second of a pair of sales. H0: Variables ‘‘DUAL 2*Quarter’’ are redundant as a set;
F  1.44***. H0: Mean abnormal four-quarter holding-period change is 0; F  2.39. H0: Mean
abnormal eight-quarter holding-period change is 0; F  7.53*.
*Test statistic is signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
**Test statistic signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
***Test statistic is signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level.
holding-period gains indicate negative means for the mid-range houses; however,
only the eight-quarter holding-period mean is signiﬁcant. For the high-end houses,
mean abnormal returns are negative; again, only the eight-quarter holding-period
results are signiﬁcant.
For the RETURN variable, the null hypothesis that the cross product variables are
redundant as a set can be rejected. Abnormal holding-period gains average positive
values. The eight-quarter means are signiﬁcant for both groups, but only the high-
end houses had a signiﬁcant four-quarter mean abnormal return.
The Significance of the Choice to Return to an Agent
The Bailey, Muth and Nourse (1963) coefﬁcients estimated from the full sample,
shown in Exhibit 3, indicate that the price index would range from 1.000 in theHomeowners’ Repeat-Sale Gains  287
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Exhibit 6  Return to First Sale’s Selling Agent as Listing Agent for Second of Paired Sales, WLS Estimates






Q 1997 4 0
(na)
Q 1998 1 0.0128
(1.40)
Omitted Section of Exhibit
Q 2003 1 0.1222
(10.08)*
RETURN*Q 1997 4 0
(na)
RETURN*Q 1998 1 0.0045
(0.28)
RETURN*Q 1998 2 0.0134
(0.91)
RETURN*Q 1998 3 0.0196
(1.30)
RETURN*Q 1998 4 0.0230 0.0230
(1.42)
RETURN*Q 1999 1 0.0037 0.0082
(0.22)
RETURN*Q 1999 2 0.0119 0.0015
(0.80)
RETURN*Q 1999 3 0.0170 0.0025
(1.09)
RETURN*Q 1999 4 0.0298 0.0069 0.0298
(1.48)
RETURN*Q 2000 1 0.0063 0.0100 0.0019
(0.31)
RETURN*Q 2000 2 0.0298 0.0180 0.0164
(1.92)**
RETURN*Q 2000 3 0.0240 0.0070 0.0044
(1.50)
RETURN*Q 2000 4 0.0025 0.0274 0.0205
(0.15)
RETURN*Q 2001 1 0.0495 0.0558 0.0458
(2.84)*
RETURN*Q 2001 2 0.0267 0.0032 0.0148
(1.76)***288  Evans and Kolbe
Exhibit 6  (continued)
Return to First Sale’s Selling Agent as Listing Agent for Second of Paired Sales, WLS Estimates






RETURN*Q 2001 3 0.0638 0.0399 0.0468
(4.07)*
RETURN*Q 2001 4 0.0653 0.0628 0.0354
(3.83)*
RETURN*Q 2002 1 0.0686 0.0190 0.0749
(4.22)*
RETURN*Q 2002 2 0.0498 0.0231 0.0199
(3.17)*
RETURN*Q 2002 3 0.0548 0.0090 0.0308
(3.72)*
RETURN*Q 2002 4 0.0639 0.0013 0.0614
(4.16)*
RETURN*Q 2003 1 0.0856 0.0171 0.0361
(4.17)*
Average Holding Period Change 0.0125 0.0282
Notes: t-ratios are beneath coefﬁcients. RETURN  (1,0) to indicate that one agent served both
parties in the second of a pair of sales. H0: Variables ‘‘RETURN*Quarter’’ are redundant as a set;
F  5.96*. H0: Mean abnormal four-quarter holding-period change is 0; F  56.4*. H0: Mean
abnormal eight-quarter holding-period change is 0; F  95.9*.
*Test statistic is signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
**Test statistic signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
***Test statistic is signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level.
fourth quarter of 1997, exp(0), to 1.136 midway into the ﬁrst quarter of 2003,
exp(0.1271), for houses with no incidence of dual agency and no return use of an
agent. The interpretation of the coefﬁcient on the RETURN variable is that the
index for the ﬁrst quarter of 2003 among houses where RETURN  1 would be
1.185, exp(0.1271  0.0422). Thus, a homeowner taking the option of reselling
the house using the same agent who ﬁrst sold the house would have an expected
gain that is 4.3% higher than the 13.6% gain attributable to market trends. The
indicated premiums are 5.1% for the mid-range houses and 4.0% for the high-end
houses.
Using the Archer, Gatzlaff and Ling (1996) coefﬁcients reported in Exhibit 6 for
the full sample, the mean abnormal gain over four-quarter holding-periods wasHomeowners’ Repeat-Sale Gains  289
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Mean F-Statistic Mean F-Statistic
DUAL 1
H0: Cross Product Variables Are Redundant As a Set 22.0* 0.78
H0: Mean 4-Q Abnormal Change  0 0.0474 2.10 0.0009 0.05
H0: Mean 8-Q Abnormal Change  0 0.0363 0.68 0.0077 1.28
DUAL 2
H0: Cross Product Variables Are Redundant As a Set 31.5* 1.29
H0: Mean 4-Q Abnormal Change  0 0.0051 0.20 0.0038 0.91
H0: Mean 8-Q Abnormal Change  0 0.0581 8.14* 0.0107 2.65***
RETURN
H0: Cross Product Variables Are Redundant As a Set 29.1* 4.72*
H0: Mean 4-Q Abnormal Change  0 0.0265 2.28 0.0129 30.6*
H0: Mean 8-Q Abnormal Change  0 0.0779 6.09* 0.0317 66.3*
Notes: t-ratios are beneath coefﬁcients. DUAL 1  (1,0) indicates that one agent served both
parties in the ﬁrst of a pair of sales. DUAL 2  (1,0) indicates that one agent served both parties
in the second of a pair of sales. RETURN  (1,0) indicates that the same agent represented buyer
in the ﬁrst transaction and seller in the second.
*Test statistic is signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
**Test statistic signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
***Test statistic is signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level.
1.3%, 1-exp(0.0125), beyond the market’s average of 2.6% price gains. Sub-
market premiums were 2.7% for mid-range houses, 1-exp(0.0265), and 1.3% for
high-end houses, 1-exp(0.0129).
 Conclusion
One of the main research questions addressed here regards whether agency
variables are associated with heteroscedasticity in repeat-sale price index models.
Statistically signiﬁcant heteroscedasticity appears in every test and every sub-
sample set-wise test. Dual agency occurring in the ﬁrst of the pair of sales is not
signiﬁcant as a source of heteroscedasticity in any one-variable test. Dual agency
occurring in the second sale is not a signiﬁcant source of heteroscedasticity in
any test using the full sample or the high-end sub-sample.
Returning to the same agent for resale does have statistically convincing inﬂuence
on the variance of price gains across owners for the full sample and for the high-290  Evans and Kolbe
end sub-sample. General users of repeat-sale price index methods may add agency
variables to their growing list of sources of heteroscedasticity.
Another research question addressed here regards the expected value of the price
gain over a homeowner’s tenure. Returning to the selling agent for service as a
listing agent is the only variable that had consistent expected price gain results
across all samples. In the Bailey, Muth and Nourse (1963) repeat-sale regression
format for tests on the effect of variables other than time, returning to the selling
agent for service as listing agent for resale has a positive mean effect on the price
gain. Archer, Gatzlaff and Ling’s (1996) abnormal holding-period returns were
consistently positive for the set of owners who returned to their earlier agent.
Dual agency in the ﬁrst of an owner’s pair of transactions over the period of
tenancy had no statistically signiﬁcant results in any sample alternative, using
either model. Tests for abnormal expected price gain from dual agency in the
owner’s second transaction indicated negative inﬂuence in all but one test across
the models and sample alternatives. However, the tests often had no statistical
signiﬁcance. The strongest statement possible across all sample alternatives comes
from the Archer, Gatzlaff and Ling model (1996). For eight-quarter holding-
periods, owners had negative mean abnormal price gains associated with accepting
dual agency when they sold at the end of their tenancy. Negative coefﬁcients in
the Bailey, Muth and Nourse (1963) model for the full sample and the high-end
sub-sample are consistent with those results, but are weak relative to the possibility
of random sampling error.
In terms of public policy, do the principal/agent conﬂicts inherent in the real estate
brokerage industry cause homeowner losses associated with dual agency? The
review of the literature of applications of cross-sectional, hedonic methods found
a mix of results—no effect, dual agency favoring buyers, and dual agency favoring
sellers.
The introductory section has an argument that two alternative types of test could
substantiate persistent claims by some consumer advocates. Misrepresentation may
be important in individual cases, but relatively rare. In that case, heteroscedasticity
would be associated with dual agency. The results on heteroscedasticity give no
general conclusion that dual agency is important in individual cases.
If misrepresentation is widespread and systematic in effect, then expected price
gains should reﬂect the direction of the bias. If buyers are systematically cheated
in dual agency, then regressions with dependent variables measuring gain during
ownership should have negative coefﬁcients on variables indicating that a
homeowner ﬁrst bought the house under dual agency. Abnormal gains over given
holding periods should have negative averages for that sub-market. By similar
argument, there would be positive regression coefﬁcients and positive average
abnormal gains for the group characterized by dual agency on the second
transaction if buyers are systematically cheated. If dual agency is biased in favor
of buyers, then the pattern of signs would be reversed.Homeowners’ Repeat-Sale Gains  291
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The results reported here give some incidence of a suspicious pattern of signs and
some incidence of statistical signiﬁcance. However, there is no case where both
statistical signiﬁcance and pattern would allow us to support any claim of bias
associated with dual agency. For this sample of agents and homebuyers, the repeat-
sale methodology applied here yields no indictment of agents.
Several caveats have been discussed as limiting the generality of these conclusions.
The data set did not have variables that would allow applications of other path-
breaking methodologies in the literature on repeat-sale price indexes, such as Case
and Quigley (1991) and Hill, Knight and Sirmans (1997). In addition, the data
applied here had no variable clearly distinguishing the second agent as a buyer’s
agent versus a sub-agent of the seller’s agent. Suppose that having a separate
agent who is a sub-agent gives the buyer virtually no more protection than
accepting dual agency. In that case, a three-way indicator analysis would be
needed to divide expected gain across homeowner sub-groups with independent
agents, dual agency and agents tied to the seller by sub-agency.
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